Friday, 23 June 2017

What is Agitating the Farmers?

Farmer agitation in Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Maharashtra has been in the news recently.[i] [ii] Tragically, there have been deaths in the current agitation[iii] and large number of suicides by farmers (especially in MP) in the months leading up to the agitation and since.[iv] Ironically, these suicides have taken place even as MP boasted of a 20% rate of growth in agriculture in recent years.[v] The situation is no better in Maharashtra where also a large number of farmer suicides have taken place.[vi]
The government of Maharashtra has announced loan waivers to farmers in order to end the agitation which had rocked the state.[vii] However, it has been pointed out that this cannot be a solution to the problem in other states since only Maharashtra has the fiscal capacity to bear the burden of loan waivers.[viii] In Madhya Pradesh there has been no loan waiver, reducing the Chief Minister to symbolic gestures such as fasting for peace.[ix] The Central government has distanced itself from loan waivers, with the Finance Minister leaving the states to fend for themselves.[x]
Causes for the Farmer Agitation
Agrarian crisis in India is a deep and complex problem and it is impossible to tackle it in a blogpost. Numerous studies on the issue are available and I draw the attention of the reader to this review of some of these books.[xi] See also State of Indian Agriculture 2015-16.[xii]
In this note, I want to examine one issue that has cropped in numerous discussions, namely, the steep decline in the prices of agricultural products. This has been implicated especially in the context of prices of pulses.[xiii] As far back as September 2016, a panel headed by the Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian had recommended higher Minimum Support Prices (MSP) for pulses. Specifically, it was recommended that the MSP of gram (Please see glossary at the end of this note for English names of pulses) should be raised to Rs 4,000 a quintal and Rs 6,000 a quintal for both urad and tur.[xiv] The committee also recommended subsidies to farmers for growing pulses and called for the elimination of ad hoc measures like export ban on pulses. 
However, the government disregarded the recommendations of the Subramanian committee and did not put in place an appropriate MSP mechanism. As it turned out, 2016-17 witnessed a bumper crop in pulses. It is well-known that agriculture production follows what is known as the cobweb model: high price for an agricultural product in a year is signal to farmers that demand is not being met and, hence, the next year they increase the supply of the product. Further, with adaptive expectations, farmers estimate prices in the current time period to be related to prices they estimated in the previous time period adjusted for any errors that they might have made in their predictions in the previous time period.[xv] The behavior of pulses farmers in MP followed the tenets of the cobweb model perfectly: “Higher prices of crops like pulses and wheat in the previous years led to higher plantings. Farmers planted a record area under pulses in 2016-17 responding to price signals from the previous year…”.[xvi] The consequence of this was a 37% increase in pulses production in 2016-17 leading to market prices dipping below the MSP.[xvii] It is important to note that the collapse of prices has not been confined to pulses but has spread to other products such as tomatoes, potatoes and onions.[xviii] In addition, it has been suggested that the shock of demonetisation in November 2016 also had a role to play.[xix] With 86% of cash being sucked out of the economy and remonetisation proceeding at glacial pace, there was a collapse of demand. Two reasons could be adduced for this fall in demand: one, demonetisation led to a slowdown of the informal economy with many losing their source of livelihood and hence without the ability to buy products in the market; two, much of the rural economy is cash economy and, with the absence of cash, buyers were unable to buy their requirements as per their usual demand.
What is the Evidence?
I now try to look at what the data tell us about the prices of pulses and some other products. The data that I use – monthly Wholesale Price Index (WPI) of a variety of products – is sourced from the Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.[xx] The monthly data that is used ranges from April 2012 till April 2017. Usually, monthly data have a lot of seasonal variations which need to be eliminated so that meaningful changes in the data can be isolated. Seasonal variations recur year after year. For example, prices of agricultural products may be low immediately after harvesting and this pattern will repeat itself year after year. If we wish to find out if any other factors are affecting prices, we should remove the effect of seasonality on prices i.e. we should deseasonalise the data. This will allow us to identify and estimate the effect of other factors on prices. I have deseasonlised the data using the X12 method.[xxi] This method is used by many countries - USA, UK, countries in Europe - to deseasonalise quarterly or monthly data. As a final step, using the deseasonalised data, I have computed the annualized monthly rate of growth of prices of products that are included in this analysis. To compute such a rate of growth (or rate of inflation), one uses the percentage increase in the WPI value in, say, April 2017 over the WPI value in April 2016. I have done this for all the agricultural products analysed here.
Consider first the rate of inflation for all pulses (Fig. 1):


 Figure 1 and, indeed all other figures in this section, focus only on the months from October to April for the years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17. There are two reasons for these months only: one, this makes the diagrams less cluttered but, more importantly, I wanted to especially cover the time period that includes demonetisation and the months leading up to the farmer agitation.
In Figure 1, the year 2015-16 shows a very high rate of inflation of prices of pulses which moderated substantially from October to January of 2016-17. In fact, the rate turns negative from February to April 2017, which are the months leading up to the agitation of May 2017. The moderation of the rate of inflation of pulses  over October to January 2016-17 is not surprising given the high level of prices that prevailed in the corresponding months in the previous year. What is surprising, however, is the negative rate of inflation in the subsequent months.
Among all the pulses depicted in Figure 1, gram and rajma are the only pulses that do not show any collapse of prices in 2016-17. Figure 2 shows the situation for gram. We do not show the rate of inflation for rajma, though it looks similar to Figure 2.


 However, the next few figures show a dramatic collapse of prices of other pulses.



Prices of arhar have fallen dramatically in 2016-17. It is one thing for the rate of inflation to be moderated on the back of high price rise the previous year but it is shocking to see the massive negative rate of inflation in 2016-17. Is it only the base effect of 2015-16 at work or is there something else that has driven prices down?
The story of arhar is repeated for moong (Fig. 4), masur (Fig. 5) and urad (Fig.6).
There has also been mention of the collapse of prices of vegetables in some of the analyses that are available.[xxii] Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the rates of inflation for onions, potatoes and tomatoes.

All the three vegetables show negative rates of inflation as in the case of some of the pulses.
Additional Effect of Demonetisation
The various figures presented in the previous section show substantial negative rates of inflation for some pulses and the three vegetables, onion, potatoes and tomatoes. Was that negative rate of inflation due to the base effect, i.e. exceptionally high price rise, in 2015-16 or was there an additional effect of demonetisation? It is very likely demonetisation reduced demand for these agricultural products which, combined with high levels of production, led to the huge negative rate of inflation in the prices of pulses and vegetables.
I try to examine this effect of demonetisation by first proposing a model which relates price inflation in a particular month to price inflation in the same month, one year (i.e. 12 months) earlier. That is,
INFLATION(%)t = f(INFLATION(%)t-12)                                                                      …(1)
I estimate the simple model depicted in equation (1) (with a slight modification discussed below) for price inflation data for gram, arhar, moong, masur, urad, chawli, rajma, onions, potatoes and tomatoes for the years 2013-14 to 2016-17. The data used to estimate model (1) above looks like the scatter diagram in Figure 10.


Figure 10 shows that current rate of inflation (i.e. INFLATIONt), measured on the horizontal axis, is high if past rate of inflation (i.e. INFLATIONt-12), measured on the vertical axis, was low and vice versa. The general shape of the scatter diagram shows that values are high towards the left of the diagram and low towards the right. This is depicted in Figure 10 by a free-hand black line drawn through the scatter diagram. This line shows the directionality of the scatter of points and has a negative slope. A negative slope is exactly what would be expected: if the rate of inflation of, say, gram was high last year, then famers see that as a signal that supply was unable to keep pace with demand; hence, for the current year, they seek to expand the area for the cultivation of gram which results in much greater production leading to softening of prices in the current year (i.e. a lower rate of inflation) or even an actual fall in prices (i.e. negative rate of inflation). This behavior of farmers has reference to the cobweb model discussed earlier in this note.
The task before me was to use the data to estimate the black line in Figure 10. However, a modification is necessary in order to also study the effect of demonetisation. This is done by employing a dummy variable (Note: a dummy variable takes on only two values: 1 if some condition is satisfied; 0, if the condition is not satisfied) to introduce demonetisation into model (1) shown above. This dummy variable takes a value of zero for every month before November 2016 (i.e. the pre-demonetisation time period) and value of 1 from November 2016 till April 2017 to identify the post-demonetisation time period. In Figure 10, this effect of demonetisation will be seen as leftward movement of the black line. This displacement of the black line is shown by the red line.
The estimated model that is used in the analysis is available in the appendix for those who are interested. In Figure 11, I depict the estimated black and red lines of Figure 10.
  

 It may be noted that the points that lie along the two straight lines in Figure 11 are not the same as the free-hand drawn straight lines in Figure 10. The points along the two lines in Figure 11 emerge from estimating, on the basis of data,  the black and red lines of Figure 10. The upper sequence of points in Figure 11 corresponds to the black line in Figure 10 while the lower sequence of points corresponds to the red line in Figure 10. To illustrate the effect of demonetization, consider the following: a 50% rate of inflation twelve months ago (measured on the vertical axis), and shown by the horizontal black line in Figure 11, would have led to a value of -20% for the current year’s rate of inflation i.e. where the vertical black line meets the horizontal axis However, during the period of demonetisation this would have led to a further fall i.e. -40%, as shown by the red lines. This additional fall of 20 percentage points is the effect of demonetisation over and above the fall in prices due to much higher production in the current year.
Summing up
Instability in agricultural prices is a well-studied phenomenon and, hence, it is not surprising that farmers in Madhya Pradesh and other states have faced problems with fluctuating prices. It was precisely for this reason that the Chief Economic Advisor had cautioned the government in September 2016 that the MSP  for pulses would have to be raised. Of course, at that time, CEA would not have anticipated the nasty shock of demonetisation that awaited the economy just a couple of month down the line. That shock has made worse the usual instability in agricultural prices that farmers face. What does this portend for this year? If the models of agricultural prices have validity, it is very likely that, given the experience of November 2016 to April 2017, farmers might move away from production of pulses which would reduce supply substantially in the months ahead. This is likely to create shortages and push up prices substantially. The government would need to stand ready to meet this eventuality.

Technical Appendix

We report below the estimated fixed effects model that underlies Figure 11. Numbers in brackets below the coefficients are p-values.


Number of observations: 370
R-squared (within) = 0.3646
F-stat = 102.71 (0.00)

where,
INFLATION(%)it = Rate of inflation of agricultural product i in month t
INFLATION(%)i,t-12 = Rate of inflation of agricultural product i in month t-12
DEMON = Dummy variable for demonetisation defined as:
                  = 1 for months November 2016 onwards
                  = 0 for months prior to November 2016  

It may be noted that the above equation was also estimated as random effects model which yielded coefficient values very similar to those reported above. The Hausman test indicated that either model could be used. See below:

Hausman test for Fixed Effects versus Random Effects model: 1.56 (0.21)

Glossary
Arhar: also called tur or toovar, refers to Pigeon Pea or Red Gram
Chawli: black-eyed beans
Gram: Generally refers to chana dal which is Split Bengal gram
Masur: Red lentils
Moong: Green gram
Rajma: Kidney beans
Urad: Black gram (whole) or white gram (when de-husked)

Source: http://www.shreyasbharadwaj.com/my-life/indian-names-for-food-products

ENDNOTES:


[i] http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/why-farmers-in-madhya-pradesh-are-on-warpath-against-shivraj-singh-chouhan-govt/story-7bCbncNPio1fPbxGTZ7n4M.html
[ii] http://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai-news/farmers-agitation-across-maharashtra-and-the-politics-of-it/story-rL6SZDzZoI1bDtyuT7o0VP.html
[iii] http://indianexpress.com/article/india/why-farmers-in-madhya-pradesh-and-maharashtra-are-protesting-4691485/
[iv] http://www.hindustantimes.com/bhopal/three-farmers-ended-life-every-day-in-mp-ncrb/story-wyP4FZHJHqMpbXMeZlInHM.html
[v] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/madhya-pradesh-11000-farmer-suicides-reported-in-9-years/articleshow/59109031.cms
[vi] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/maharashtra-farmer-suicides-rise-15-per-cent-to-235-in-march/articleshow/58251835.cms
[vii] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/1bfn7TaLTIVbvKOqdkhCzM/Maharashtra-govt-announces-farm-loan-waiver.html
[viii] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/3xGYAPQjK0RQKfBGrRuOjJ/Only-Maharashtra-has-fiscal-capacity-to-pay-for-farm-loan-wa.html
[ix] http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mp-farmers-agitation-cm-shivraj-chouhan-to-sit-on-indefinite-fast-till-peace-is-restored/story-0C1HwEV1iT6lcL1LsjIbEO.html
[x] http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/states-keen-on-farm-loan-waiver-must-generate-funds-from-own-resources-fm-arun-jaitley-4699965/
[xi] http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/36854521/Agrarian_Crisis_and_Agrarian_Questions_in_India.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1497774668&Signature=IR43LNtXOLsXKlPKSXCQ2JOwBiU%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DAgrarian_Crisis_and_Agrarian_Questions_i.pdf
[xii] http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF/State_of_Indian_Agriculture,2015-16.pdf
[xiii] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/why-loan-waivers-wont-fix-indias-agriculture-woes/articleshow/59086914.cms
[xiv] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/announce-higher-msp-for-pulses-speed-up-procurement-cea-panel/articleshow/54365763.cms
[xv] See Christophe Gouel (2012) Agricultural Price Instability: A Survey of Competing Explanations and Remedies, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 129–156
[xvi] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/2B9xur0n85S5Nl2HRnSzuM/The-story-behind-Indias-bumper-crop-year.html
[xvii] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/2B9xur0n85S5Nl2HRnSzuM/The-story-behind-Indias-bumper-crop-year.html
[xviii] http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-crops-of-wrath-demonetisation-4699598/
[xix] http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mandsaur-agitation-how-demonetisation-brought-mp-farmers-onto-streets/story-fD9hc9HkXhHEmFPgZqXduK.html
[xx] http://eaindustry.nic.in/download_data_0405.asp
[xxi] https://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/general-methodology/time-series-analysis/guide-to-seasonal-adjustment.pdf
[xxii] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/price-fall-centre-to-procure-2-lt-onions-from-mp/articleshow/59201733.cms

Saturday, 10 December 2016

Demonetisation: A Thunderbolt in Search of a Target


Enough has been written about the sudden demonetisation that was sprung on the country by Prime Minister Modi on 8 November 2016. The pros and cons of it have been discussed in detail over the last month and I have nothing more to add beyond what has already been stated by first-rate minds in India and abroad. Economists of impeccable reputation have commented on it and have warned that the move is likely to hurt the economy in the short run. See, for example, commentaries by Amartya Sen,[1] Kaushik Basu,[2] Paul Krugman,[3] Larry Summers,[4] Kenneth Rogoff,[5]  and Gita Gopinath[6] among others. In a major shift in his opinion, Deepak Parekh now believes that demonetisation will derail the Indian economy.[7] Even Arvinda Pangariya, Vice-Chairman Niti Ayog (formerly the Planning Commission) has acknowledged that there will be short-term costs and that the process of demonetisation has been poorly managed.[8]
To be fair, there are others – Bibek Debroy,[9] Surjit Bhalla[10] and Bill Gates (though he changed his mind pretty quickly[11]) - who have supported the move by the government. In fact, Bibek Debroy has taken to task the economists who have had the temerity to criticize demonetisation: “They (i.e. economists living abroad) base their understanding essentially on reading English newspapers. Otherwise, how would they know? English language newspapers understood many things wrongly”.[12] So, the economists are wrong because they do not live in India. Alas, this is the usual ploy of attacking the critics when the criticism cannot be effectively answered.
In all the sound and fury surrounding demonetisation, the silence of one economist has been deafening: the government’s own Chief Economic Advisor (CEA) Arvind Subramanian. When the government has been struggling to answer the criticism levelled against demonetisation, would it not be obvious to field its CEA to respond to the critics? But he has been missing in action.[13] Perhaps the government does not trust him enough or perhaps, invoking what Subramanian Swamy had said about Raghuram Rajan,[14] the CEA does not know enough about India since he is not Indian enough.

Searching for a Rationale of Demonetisation
Curbing Black Money
During the course of the last month, the objectives of the demonetisation drive have been changing continuously. The initial focus was on curbing black money. However, it soon became apparent that this was unlikely to reveal a large amount of black money since only about 6% of such money is kept in cash. Moreover, the generation or flow of black money has remained unchecked and all that demonetisation could, optimistically, hope to achieve was extinguish only a small fraction of the huge accumulated stock of black wealth. Consequently, it is not at all surprising that suspicious amount of money in the form of new currency notes have been recovered during tax raids.[15]
The above criticism of demonetisation is reinforced by a recent statement of the Revenue Secretary in the Finance Ministry who has stated that the government expects all scrapped Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes to come back to the banking system which then raises questions about the very purpose of the hugely disruptive demonetisation exercise.[16] It may be remembered that the government expected that, of the Rs 15.4 lakh crore of scrapped money, 30 per cent or Rs 4.5 lakh crore was black (i.e. this money would not find its way back to the banks). It is now being accepted that at most one-third of the Rs. 4.5.lakh crore may be black money and, with the deadline for depositing now defunct notes in banks still some weeks away, even less black money is likely to caught.
Cashless Economy
As the hollowness of demonetisation as a means of controlling black incomes has become apparent, a wonderful world of cash-less economy has been dangled in front of the country. The Prime Minister has exhorted rural audiences in his election rallies in the Punjab to think of their mobile phones as banks.[17] Given that much of rural India does not even have access to banks, this seems like a cruel joke. While access to banks has increased with the Jan Dhan accounts opened during the last two years, the percentage of persons in rural areas without bank accounts is still significant.[18] Moreover, many of the Jan Dhan accounts have a zero-balance which suggests that the size of unbanked population may be declining but the numbers of those actually using banks continues to remain low. But a sneaky game is afoot: banks have been depositing one rupee into the zero-balance accounts so as to reduce the number of such accounts![19]
A cash-less society is a chimera which does little to alter the depressing reality where mere access to banks is still a challenge, leave alone usage of mobile banking and plastic money. This is not the criticism of a technophobe but rather a plea to recognize the reality of the society we live in. Before one talks of cashless society, it is important to ensure the spread of banking which, if pursued relentlessly, is likely to meet with much greater success in curbing black money. One cannot leapfrog into cashless society from one which still conducts 68% of its transactions in cash.[20] Forcing people to do so requires coercion and does not sit well with democracy. Cultures and habits of the populace do change but certainly not at the behest of a government diktat.
Reduction in Violence in Kashmir
The desperation of the government to see some silver lining to the disaster of demonetisation became starkly apparent when the Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, made the fantastic connection between monetary policy (i.e. demonetisation) and the violence in Kashmir.[21] Parrikar’s absurd claim cannot be taken seriously by anyone who has studied the Kashmir problem.[22] The incidence of stone-throwing had been exhibiting a declining trend even before the announcement of demonetisation: in July 2016 there were 820 incidents; in August, there were 747; in September, there were 535; in October, this had fallen sharply to 157. This pattern has merely continued in November and would have done so quite independently of demonetisation. It was not monetary policy that did the trick but time-tested policing as stated by a police officer: “We have detained the provocateurs of violence and those people who were instigating the youth to pelt stones. All these measures are showing the results”.[23] By attributing the decline in violence to demonetisation, the Defense Minister does great disservice to our police who have brought under control one of the worst episodes of violence in Kashmir.
Putting the Opposition on the Mat
As demonetisation has spun out of control and is not the surgical strike that it was claimed to be, the government and the BJP have gone on an offensive. How else does one explain the impossible claim of Amit Shah, President of the BJP, that black money will vanish from India by the end of 2016?[24] Shah has also been tasked with demolishing former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stinging criticism of the government in Parliament when he referred to demonetisation as organized loot and legalized plunder.[25] The BJP and its acolytes have reacted in the only way they can: by attacking the critic but leaving the criticism unanswered. It was left to Amit Shah – using of combination of half-truths and downright lies – to try and do a demolition job on Manmohan Singh.[26] While there is no attempt to answer the criticism, Shah seeks to demolish Manmohan Singh’s stature as an economist by claiming that a non-economist Prime Minister before Singh (i.e. Atal Bihari Vajpayee) and tea-seller Prime Minister after Singh (i.e. Narendra Modi) had delivered better growth to the Indian economy. Such nonsense is music to the ears of the devotees (bhakts as they are derisively called) of the BJP for whom facts and truth are an inconvenience to be ignored or changed at will. However, those who have the slightest respect for facts and truth will recognize the fake news that Shah is purveying.
Shah said that, when Vajpayee demitted office, India’s growth rate was 8% while at the end of Singh’s term in office it was 4%; ergo, Vajpayee managed the economy better. I see absolutely no reason why one should focus only on one specific year in the term of a government? Perhaps because it helps to advance a fake narrative? The chart below shows a comparison between full terms of Vajpayee’s government (NDA-1) and Singh’s governments (UPA-1 and UPA-2). Incidentally, the data I use is verifiable and sourced from one of the most respected institutions in the country, namely, the Reserve Bank of India.[27]



The average for the entire term of NDA-1 is 5.88% per annum; for UPA-1, it is 8.43% per annum; and for UPA-2 (despite the slowdown in the last two years) it is 6.88% per annum. It should also be mentioned that, despite the worst world-wide recession in about a century during 2008-09 to 2010-11, the UPA, not only protected the Indian economy from its ill effects but, in fact, delivered growth rates of 6.72%, 8.59% and 8.91% during those years. It is only in 2011-12 that the Indian economy began to run out steam to internal reasons (such as, policy paralysis) and pressures from the weak performance of the global economy. But, of course, for the committed supporters, such facts don’t matter. Isn’t it amazing how blind support is so similar in the two largest democracies – India and the USA – in the world? In both countries, there has been the disturbing tendency for uncritical supporters accept fake news as truth and reject truth as fake.
Shah further stated that the NDA-2 government, over its two completed years in office, had delivered growth of around 7.5% per annum which is better than the 4% growth rate that it inherited. Anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of arithmetic knows that the 4.74% rate that was actually achieved in 2013-14 (see Figure 1) is rounded up to 5% and not rounded down to 4%! But that is a minor travesty. The bigger one is the fact that the way of measuring GDP has undergone a change from January 2015[28] and this has been ignored by Amit Shah. The changed methodology has been used to report a new series of GDP from 2011-12 onwards. As a result, for the years, 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 (the last three years of the UPA-2) two different sets of GDP data are available. Hence, while making comparisons, it is important to select GDP data that are comparable. Specifically, when comparing the GDP data for the last three years of UPA-2 with the first two years of NDA-2, one must use the new series of GDP introduced in 2015.
In view of the above caveat regarding comparison, the rate of growth of around 7.5%  under NDA-2 as per the new methodology cannot be compared with rate of 4.74% rate in 2013-14 (last year of UPA-2) as per the old methodology. A cavalier comparison, as done by Amit Shah, would be like comparing the weight of one person in pounds and that of another in kilograms and using these weights to decide who is heavier. The correct comparison – using the same methodology to measure GDP during the two regimes – is given in the chart below.

Now, the comparison between the rates of growth in the last year of UPA-2 with that of the two years of NDA-2 is meaningful. Note that the growth rates during the last two years of the UPA-2 are higher as per the new methodology. The rates were 4.47% (2012-13) and 4.74% (2013-14) as per the old methodology (see Figure 1) while, as per the new methodology, the rates are 5.62% and 6.64% (Figure 2). Given this, Amit Shah’s correct comparison should have been between the rate of growth of 6.64% in 2013-14 with 7.24% in 2014-15. It is now obvious that the difference between the two growth rates is not as bad for the UPA-2 as has been made out by Shah and other ill-informed critics.
It is certainly true that, even as per the new methodology, the performance of UPA-2 did drop in the last two years of its rule but that certainly does not qualify, by any stretch of imagination, as a destruction of the economy, as has been claimed. For a more detailed discussion, readers are invited to have a look at an earlier post of mine entitled “Did the UPA Destroy the Economy? A Counterfactual Exercise”.[29]
Long Term Benefits of Demonetisation
As the demonetisation story has unraveled and there seems to be no sign of any immediate benefit, the spin doctors have pulled out the allure of long term benefits out of the bag of tricks. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has claimed that “When you are in a cusp of history and you look at the long-term impact of these steps which are going to be taken, I think India is going to become a society in the long term with a certainly better GDP, cleaner ethics, a cleaner economy”.[30] So, what happened to Modi’s tearful cry from the heart which asked for forbearance for 50 days, after which all pain would vanish? As the short-term benefits (if any) have been overwhelmed by the huge short-term costs, the government has thought it best to dangle a vision of paradise in the distant future – since this can never be verified, anything good that happens to the Indian economy in the future can be attributed to demonetisation.
Long term growth requires consistent, stable and predictable policy-making which then allows private businesses/producers to plan for the future. A severe disruption to the system, like demonetisation, creates doubts in the minds of producers about the policy regime likely to prevail in the future. The natural reaction of risk-averse producers is to postpone crucial investment decisions awaiting clarity regarding the direction policy is likely to take. Over the last two years, private investment has been sluggish at best and demonetisation is likely to act as one more stumbling block for investment decisions. Anyone familiar with the Solow growth model is aware of the importance of private investment in determining growth in an economy. Hence, any disruption that damages the confidence of private players to invest cannot but lead to a drop in investments and, hence, in growth rates in the future.
It is true that numerous cross-country studies have revealed that economies that are low in corruption have been found to perform better.[31] However, demonetisation has been seen to be anything but an anti-corruption measure. The Prime Minister’s threat of letting loose tax officials to unearth black wealth will achieve nothing apart from causing immense turmoil to the lives of law-abiding citizens while those with illegal wealth would have squirreled it away from the reach of tax officials. Controlling corruption requires changing the incentive structure for generating illegal incomes. This can happen only when bureaucratic controls are loosened, tax administration is simplified and ease of doing business is improved. None of the measures on display so far will have the slightest impact on corruption and, hence, no beneficial impact on India’s growth.

Summing Up
Having examined the various possible rationales that have been trotted out to justify the demonetisation unleashed by the Prime Minister and found little evidence to back these up, the question remains as to why this step was taken at all? How could a politician, as astute as Narendra Modi, have taken such a momentous step without weighing up the costs of this decision and the damage this might do his and his party’s popularity? I am not in slightest suggesting that the NDA’s hold on political power is about to be threatened. With the opposition so completely fragmented and the Congress in thrall of an inept leader-in-waiting, there is little danger of any meaningful challenge to the NDA. But, even for a leader confident about his position, there is a constant need to keep playing the messianic role that he has arrogated for himself. As the months have rolled on and half the term of the government has been completed, there have been no eyeball-grabbing achievements that the BJP can boast of to keep the BJP supporters enthusiastic and galvanized for the 2019 elections. Hence, something dramatic was required. The mundane task of governance was clearly not enough to keep intact the popularity of the leader. For example, the perfectly admirable task of improving the ease of doing business in India was taking too long to show dramatic results and hardly made for histrionics at public meetings. India’s position in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business has certainly improved since 2014 but it continues to languish at a rank of 130 among 190 nations.[32] Changing the sclerotic bureaucratic structure is not easy and is unlikely to show results in a hurry. Possibly, realizing that the hard grind of governing a country was not “sexy” enough to enthuse the fanatical supporters of Modi, a dramatic gesture was needed and it arrived as a thunderbolt on 8 November 2016. And, certainly, in the days that immediately followed the announcement, whoops of joy and enthusiasm filled the air as the credentials of a muscular, risk-taking leader were reestablished.
As things stand, the costs of demonetisation seem to far outweigh the benefits, if any. Will the schadenfreude at the discomfiture of those with illegal money, experienced especially by the poor, continue despite the immense hardship and the livelihoods that have been put at peril? That is something that the future will reveal but we can be sure that the innovative and imaginative spin doctors of the BJP will have their hands full for some time to come.




[1] http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Amartya-Sen-terms-demonetisation-a-despotic-action/article16730675.ece
[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/opinion/in-india-black-money-makes-for-bad-policy.html
[3] http://www.livemint.com/Politics/6WQRkoCktgAJdagFSkcIVN/Demonetisation-may-not-deliver-long-term-benefits-to-India.html
[4] http://thewire.in/81659/larry-summers-on-demonetisation-india/
[5] http://blog.press.princeton.edu/2016/11/17/kenneth-rogoff-indias-currency-exchange-and-the-curse-of-cash/
[6] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-tax-evasion-demonetisation-by-gita-gopinath-2016-11
[7] http://www.news18.com/news/business/in-major-u-turn-deepak-parekh-says-demonetisation-has-derailed-economy-1320467.html
[8] http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/demonetisation-liquidity-issues-to-stay-for-three-months-says-arvind-panagariya/456488/
[9] http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/bibek-debroy-counters-ex-pm-manmohan-singh-on-demonetisation-116112600005_1.html
[10] http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/demonetisation-of-rs-500-rs-1000-notes-new-rs-2000-note-big-bang-or-big-thud-4383065/
[11] http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/bill-gates-makes-a-u-turn-on-demonetisation-116111800040_1.html
[12] http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/economists-criticism-of-demonetisation-not-fact-based-niti-aayog-member-bibek-debroy-4397845/
[13] http://thewire.in/83452/chief-economic-adviser-arvind-subramanian-missing-action/
[14] http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/remove-raghuram-rajan-subramanian-swamy-writes-to-pm-narendra-modi-1407047
[15] http://www.ndtv.com/bangalore-news/bengaluru-raids-reveal-5-crores-mostly-in-new-notes-also-a-lamborghini-1632774
[16] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/all-pain-little-gain-demonetisation-math-does-not-add-up/articleshow/55854776.cms?prtpage=1
[17] http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2016/nov/25/pm-modi-pitches-for-mobile-banking-1542567.html
[18] In 2015, it was as high as 50% which would have come down in 2016. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Basic%20Statistical%20Returns
[19] http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/how-banks-cut-their-zero-balance-jan-dhan-accounts-one-rupee-trick-3028190/
[20] http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/infographic-68-of-transactions-in-india-are-cash-based-116111400495_1.html
[21] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Demonetisation-has-led-to-decline-in-separatist-instigated-violence-in-the-Valley-MHA-sources/articleshow/55419257.cms
[22] http://thewire.in/81378/kashmir-stone-pelting-demonetisation/
[23] http://thewire.in/81378/kashmir-stone-pelting-demonetisation/
[24] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/by-year-end-india-wont-have-black-money-amit-shah/articleshow/55833192.cms
[25] http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/monumental-management-failure-dr-manmohan-singh-on-notes-ban-1629571
[26] http://aajtak.intoday.in/video/agenda-aaj-tak-amit-shah-in-talk-with-rahul-kanwal-1-900256.html
[27] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20Economy
[28] http://mospiold.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/Changes%20in%20Methodology%20NS%202011-12%20June%202015.pdf
[29] http://ajitkarnik.blogspot.ae/2014/06/did-upa-destroy-economy-counterfactual.html
[30] http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/%E2%80%98Benefits-of-demonetisation-to-accrue-in-long-term%E2%80%99/article16773645.ece
[31] ftp://ftp.iza.org/dps/dp5334.pdf
[32] http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings